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ABSTRACT

A vigorous debate has emerged regarding the expansion of trademark owners' rights
to have exclusive control over their marks in the paid search environment. A
common practice in paid search is for advertisers to purchase other companies'
trademarks as keywords for search engine results. Comparing the similarities
between the current struggles concerning trademark use as paid search keywords to
the evolution of the right to a digital public performance for sound recording owners,
this comment proposes a model that allows purchasers of other entities' trademarks
to use those marks in a Congressionally regulated fashion in a similar way section
114 of the Copyright Act regulates the digital public performance of sound
recordings.
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INTRODUCTION

Using someone else's trademark on the Internet can be either illegal or brilliant.
The difference depends on the space and media in which the mark appears.
Companies often purchase other companies' trademarks as keywords for search
engine results.1 In one of the millions of searches that occur on Google every day, the
primary natural results from the search appear on the web page based upon their
accuracy as determined by the "Google algorithm." 2 Also appearing on the page are
"sponsored links" that Google sells when someone uses a particular word or phrase in
a search. 3 This practice of selling keywords is not confined to Google. 4 To complicate
this situation, a party can purchase a trademark that it does not own as a keyword in
paid search. 5 This business method, therefore, uses the other party's trademark to
drive business to its own website through the sponsored link. 6 Until recently the
courts were split on whether use of a trademark as a keyword in paid search
constituted "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act 7, and therefore whether the use
created a likelihood of confusion.8
*
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1 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2009) (offering an
overview of Google's AdWords program).
2 See Google Corporate Information -- Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/
tech.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Google Technology Overview].
3See Google Ads - AdWords Help, https://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/static.py?page=
guide.cs&guide=21899&topic=21903 (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter AdWords Beginner's
Guide].
4 See, e.g., Yahoo! Terms and Conditions Applying to Local Advertising, http://www.yahoo.
infoservegroup.com/demo/termsandconditions.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Yahoo!'s
Local Advertising Terms and Conditions] (defining a Sponsored Link as "an advertisement (also
known as a 'featured listing') that is served on the Site in relation to a search request by a user, and
which is paid for by a Customer and which includes the Sponsored Link Information").
5 See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004).
6 See id.
7 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
8 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (overturning the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs keyword trademark infringement claims against defendant for
failure to demonstrate use in commerce); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C
03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450 at *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (holding that selling a
trademarked term as a keyword is use in commerce); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No.
04-4371, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (holding the plaintiffs mark
was used commercially when sold as a keyword and in general); Buying for the Home, LLC v.
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This comment compares the similarities between the current struggles
concerning trademark use as paid search keywords to the evolution of the right to a
digital public performance that sound recording owners received in 1995. 9 Part I
provides background information on the use of trademarks as paid search
keywords. 10 It also describes how courts have defined various paid search terms and
practices.1 1 This section then explains the structure of the digital public performance
right for sound recordings.12 Part II analyzes the current court decisions regarding
use of trademarks as keywords in paid search and compares them to the statutory
requirements for the digital public performance licenses and royalties. 13 Part III sets
forth various models to protect trademark owners' rights in paid search and proposes
a model that allows would-be infringers, or purchasers of other entities' trademarks,
to use those marks in a Congressionally regulated fashion in a similar way section
114 of the Copyright Act regulates the digital public performance of sound
14
recordings.

I. BACKGROUND

At first glance, the history of trademark use in paid search programs may
appear incongruous with the history of the public performance right for digital
transmissions of sound recordings. 15 The two concepts, however, both encompass a
distinct right that intellectual property owners have fought to preserve or acquire in
the digital space. 16 This section outlines issues that trademark owners have
encountered regarding the use of their marks as keywords in paid search, as well as
why sound recording owners needed a public performance right for digital audio
transmissions of their copyrighted works. First, it provides background information
on keyword and paid search terminology, and defines the issues in using
trademarked keywords within paid search. 17 Next, the section provides background

Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding use of the competitor's mark
by purchasing the mark as a keyword was use in commerce under the Lanham Act); Gov't
Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704 ("[W]hen defendants sell the rights to link advertising to
plaintiffs trademarks, defendants are using the trademarks in commerce in a way that may imply

that defendants have permission from the trademark holder to do so.").
9See discussion infra Part II.
10See discussion infra Part I.
11Id.
12 Id
13 See

discussion infra Part II.
discussion infra Part III.
15 See generally In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (holding Congress derives
14 See

power to pass trademark laws based upon the Constitution's Commerce Clause, not the Copyright
Clause); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1086, 1099 (2008) (discussing how in the Trade-Mark Cases
the Court differentiated between the bases of copyright and trademark law).
16See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (showing
copyright holders' fight for stricter enforcement of their rights due to peer-to-peer file-sharing
technology); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (showing trademark
owners' asserting their rights in the paid search environment).
17 See discussion infra Part I.A-B.
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information on the public performance right for digital audio transmissions of sound
8
recordings.'

A. GeneralPaidSearch Terms and Definitions
A keyword is a word or phrase that a user enters into an Internet search engine,
such as Google or Yahoo! 19 Once the user enters a keyword and clicks "Search" in the
search engine, the search engine presents links to the most relevant web pages
related to the keyword. 20 Typically, a search engine presents two types of results
21
when a user performs a search: sponsored links and natural search results.
Sponsored links appear in a labeled section at the top, side, or bottom of the page,
and natural search results are listed in the primary section of the webpage, typically
22
below the sponsored links.
Advertisers pay for sponsored links to appear on a search engine in response to a
user's search request. 23 Search engine marketing ("SEM") firms help to facilitate this
paid search practice. 24 These firms serve as liaisons between the advertisers and
search engines. 25 An advertiser can also work directly with a company that operates
26
a search engine to purchase keywords.
Advertisers bid on keywords depending on the size and scope of an advertising
campaign. 27 Advertisers can purchase and use as many keywords as they wish, and
typically use more than less because more purchased keywords usually results in
more impressions. 28 This provides the advertiser with greater online visibility. 29 An
example of a campaign would be for women's sweaters. 30 A company that sells
women's sweaters would create a campaign around this category with any number of
keywords that can be attributed to this category, including manufacturers or
retailers of these products, color information, size information, or type of material. 31
An SEM firm can help determine the right keywords for the campaign and on which
18 See discussion infra Part I.C.
19See Brookfield Commc'n, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999).
20 See id.
21 See

Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. Va. 2004).

22 See
23 See

id.
id.

24 See Shoemoney Media Group, Inc. v. Keyen Farrell, No. 8:09CV131, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40942, at *10 (stating an example of a search engine marketing firm as a company that manages
pay-per-click campaigns).
25 See id.
26 See AdWords Beginner's Guide, supranote 3.
27 See Shoemoney Media Group, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40942 at *12 (discussing strategies in
purchasing keywords for paid search).
28 See Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 15, 2008) (describing how a company may purchase multiple keywords as a paid search
strategy).
29 See id.
30 See, e.g., id. (showing how the defendant purchased a number of keywords, including the
plaintiffs trademark, in an effort to sell a specific product, money clips).
31 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396-97 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)
(showing an example of various types of search terms an advertiser may choose to use as keywords
in paid search).
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search engines to launch those campaigns based on the advertiser's budget and other
32
advertising needs.
Three major search engines dominate the US market: Google, Yahoo!, and
Microsoft's Bing (formerly "MSN"). 33 In September 2009, Google accounted for
seventy-one percent of all U.S. searches, Yahoo! accounted for sixteen percent, and
Bing accounted for nine percent.3 4 Each search engine has a slightly different
approach to trademark use in keywords within paid search, with Yahoo!'s and Bing's
35
policies being more restrictive than Google's.
Yahoo! allows parties to bid on another party's trademarked terms if the
purchaser resells the trademarked good, the use is informative, not competitive, or
the use is generic or non-trademark related.3 6 Bing restricts the purchase of
trademarked terms to resellers of the trademarked good, informational websites, or
37
when the keyword is used as a dictionary term.
Google's AdWords program dominates the keyword search market, 38 and its
keyword marketing practices differ greatly from Yahoo!'s and Bing's. 39 Before June
15, 2009, Google would investigate a complaint of trademark infringement through
keywords in the country in which the trademark owner has rights, except for the
United States, Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. 40 In these four countries,
Google left the finding of infringement up to the company that claimed
infringement. 41 Once the trademark owner found the alleged infringement, Google
would investigate and remove the sponsored link if the trademarked term appeared

32 See ShoemoneyMedia Group, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40942 at *10 (discussing how an SEM
manages a paid search campaign).
33 See Press Release from Hitwise, Google Receives 71 Percent of Searches in September 2009
(Oct. 6, 2009) (on file with author).
34

Id.

Compare Legal guidelines from Yahoo! Search Marketing (formerly Overture)-Trademarks,
http://searchmarketing.yahoo.com/legal/trademarks.php
(last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
Yahoo! Trademarks] (stating Yahoo!'s policy that bidding on trademarked terms is only allowed
when the purchaser is a reseller of the trademarked good, the use is informative, not competitive, or
the use is generic or non-trademark related), and Microsoft Ad Content Guidelines, http://
advertising.microsoft.com/learning-center/ad-content-guidelines
(last visited Jan. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter Microsoft Ad Content Guidelines] (stating Microsoft's (which includes Bing) policy that
restricts the purchase of trademarked terms to purchasers that are resellers of the trademarked
good, the website it is used to promote is an informational site only, or the term is used as a
dictionary term), with What is Google's AdWords and AdSense trademark policy?-AdWords Help,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6118
(last visited Jan. 21,
2010) [hereinafter Google AdWords Trademark Policy] (stating the region in which the trademark
owner's rights are recognized determines whether Google will investigate the use of trademarks in
advertisement text only or in advertisement text and keywords, and whether Google will disable the
keywords in response to the trademark complaint).
36 Yahoo! Trademarks, supra note 35.
37 Microsoft Ad Content Guidelines, supra note 35.
38 See Press Release from Hitwise, supra note 33.
39 See Google AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 35.
40 See Jamie N. Nafziger & Jose Hernandez, Keyword Advertising After Rescuecom:
Predictability Remains Elusive 2 (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/nafzigerkeyword advertising-cle.pdf.
41 See id.
35
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in the copy of the sponsored link. 42 Google did not and still does not investigate or
remove keywords based on a trademark infringement complaint. 43
For trademark owners with rights in countries other than the aforementioned
four, Google would investigate complaints of trademark use in keywords or copy and
remove the trademarked term from the copy or keyword list if the trademark was in
fact being used and the trademark owner so requested. 44 Google amended its policies
in June 2009 to add approximately 190 countries to the list of those Google will not
investigate the use of trademarks as keywords in its AdWords program. 45 In addition
to broadening the scope of where Google will no longer investigate keywords, the new
policy allows advertisers to use other parties' trademarks in the copy of their
46
sponsored links.

B. LitigationHistory of Trademark Use in Keywords
The Lanham Act provides federal registration and protection for trademarks
used in commerce. 47 The Lanham Act broadly defines a trademark as "any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [that is] (1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce ... ,"48 The Lanham
Act defines "use in commerce" as, "[T]he bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark."49 Trademarks do
not need federal registration for protection against unauthorized use.5 0 For example,
a trademark owner may register a mark at the state level, 51 or may receive federal
protection for unregistered marks.52
Section 1114(1) of the Lanham Act creates civil liability for a party who uses, in
commerce, a counterfeit, copy, or reproduction of a registered mark without
permission.5 3 This liability can emerge when the party sells, distributes, or
advertises any goods or services in connection with the mark in a manner that causes
confusion.5 4 Section 1125(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act imposes civil liability for the
use of another's registered or unregistered mark that "misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of, [the other] person's goods, services,
or commercial activities . . . ."5
In order to establish a case of trademark
infringement, a trademark owner must first show that the use was in commerce, and
then establish that this use created a likelihood of confusion and/or diluted the
42 See

id.

43 See Google AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 35.
44 See Nafziger, supra note 40, at 2.
45 See Google AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 35.
46 See id.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006).
48 Id. § 1127.
49 Id.
50 Id. § 1125(a)(1).
51 See, e.g. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/1-999 (West 2009) (Illinois Trademark Registration
and Protection Act).
52 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
53 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
54 Id.
55 Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
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mark. 56 U.S. courts generally agree that a trademarked term sold as a keyword for
use in paid search constitutes use in commerce.5 7 The major issue confronting courts
now is whether that use constitutes trademark infringement by creating a likelihood
58
of confusion.
Courts in the Third,5 9 Fourth,60 Eighth,6 1 and Ninth Circuits6 2 have held that
selling or purchasing trademarks as keywords through paid search is use in
commerce. For example, in Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory,
Inc., Google sold American Blind's trademarked terms as keywords through its
AdWords program to American Blind's competitors.6 3 The trademarked keywords
triggered sponsored links on Google's search results page.6 4 Google acknowledged
that it sold trademarked terms as keywords but claimed that doing so did not
65
constitute use in commerce as defined by the Lanham Act.
American Blind argued that Google not only sold its trademarked terms as
keywords to a competitor, but that Google then refused to disable those keywords
once American Blind alerted Google to the infringing act.66 At the time of this case,
Google's policies and procedures for complaints about its AdWords program stated
that Google would not disable keywords in response to a trademark complaint.6 7 The
court held that the sale of trademarked terms in Google's advertising program was a
use in commerce for the purposes of the Lanham Act.68 The court, however, did not
determine whether Google's AdWords program violated the Lanham Act.6 9 The
court, in denying most of Google's motion for summary judgment of American Blind's
trademark infringement claims, stated that the large number of businesses and users

56 Id. §§ 1114, 1125.

57 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (overturning the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs keyword trademark infringement claims against defendant for

failure to demonstrate use in commerce); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C
03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450 at *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (holding that selling a
trademarked term as a keyword is use in commerce); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No.
04-4371, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (holding the plaintiffs mark
was used commercially when sold as a keyword and in general); Buying for the Home, LLC v.

Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding use of the competitor's mark
by purchasing the mark as a keyword was use in commerce under the Lanham Act); Govt
Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("[W]hen defendants sell
the rights to link advertising to plaintiffs trademarks, defendants are using the trademarks in
commerce in a way that may imply that defendants have permission from the trademark holder to
do so.").
58 See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131 (finding use in commerce but not deciding whether this use
created a likelihood of confusion).
59 See Buying for the Home, 459 F.Supp. 2d at 323.
60 See Gov'tEmployees Ins., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
61 See EdinaRealty, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775, at *10.
62 See Google, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450 at *21.
63 Id. at *4.
64
Jd
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.

at
at
at
at
at

*7.
*5.
*4-5.
*21.
*42.
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of Google's AdWords program "indicates that a significant public interest exists in
70
determining whether the AdWords program violates trademark law."
Courts in the Second Circuit held the minority opinion that a trademark used as
a keyword did not constitute use in commerce until April 2009, when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded Google's
motion to dismiss against Rescuecom. 7 1 In Rescuecom Corp. v. Googe, Inc.,
Rescuecom claimed Google infringed its registered trademark by selling its mark as a
keyword in its AdWords program.7 2 The District Court for the Northern District of
New York held that the AdWords program use of trademarks in keywords did not
constitute use in commerce for trademark purposes.7 3 The court separated out the
Lanham Act elements of "use" and "in commerce" and held that AdWords did
commercially use Rescuecom's trademark.7 4 The use, however, was not substantial
enough to equate to the Lanham Act definition of "use in commerce." 75 The court
76
granted Google's motion to dismiss.
Rescuecom appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.7 7 On April 3, 2009, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the
District Court's decision.78 The Second Circuit did not express whether Rescuecom
could prove a Lanham Act violation, but held that Google's practice of recommending
and selling a trademarked term as a keyword to an advertiser was a use in
commerce.79

C. DigitalPublicPerformanceLicense and Royalty Structure
1. GeneralIndustry Terms and Definitions
It would be an understatement to say that the music industry has confronted
significant copyright challenges in the digital age.8 0 Much like the current debate in
trademark law over what constitutes use in commerce and likelihood of confusion,
the courts and Congress have had to determine what types of digital transmissions
and what media should be considered protected under copyright law, and how this
8
protection should occur. '
70 Id.
71 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing the District Court's
holding, deeming use of a trademark as a keyword is use in commerce, but not deciding the
likelihood of confusion issue).
72 Id. at 124.
73Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 404 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
74Id. at 400.
75Id.
76 Id. at 404.
77Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 123.
78 Id. at 131.
79Id.
80
See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 11 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 358 (discussing
how technology had and would continue to impact the delivery of sound recordings).
81 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) ("[O]ne

who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
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According to the Copyright Act, music has two components: 1) a song written by
a composer called a musical work, which is typically co-owned with a publisher;8 2 and
2) the recorded version of the song called a sound recording, which is typically owned
83
by the record label that produces the sound recording.
This bifurcation of a song carries particular importance when determining
public performance rights.8 4 The owner of the musical work, or the writer/publisher,
is the only copyright owner of a song that earns royalties for an analog (i.e.
traditional radio) performance of this song.8 5 Both the owner of the musical work and
the owner of the sound recording get paid when a song is played via a digital
transmission.86 The Copyright Act defined a "digital transmission" as, "[A]
transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other non-analog format."8 7 Examples
of a digital transmission include Internet radio such as Pandora and satellite radio
88
such as SIRIUS XM Radio.
A performance rights organization ("PRO") facilitates public performance royalty
payments to the owners of musical works and sound recordings.8 9 Three PRO's in
the United States collect public performance royalties for musical works: The
Association Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast
Music, Inc ("BMI"), and Society of European Stage Authors & Composers
("SESAC").90
These groups collect and distribute royalties to song writers or
publishers of musical works for any analog or digital public performance of a musical
work. 91 SoundExchange collects royalties for digital public performances of sound
recordings. 92 Currently, the owner of a sound recording does not have a public
performance right for analog transmissions. 93

infringement by third parties."); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 396 (6th
Cir. 2004) (holding that 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) required a different analysis for sound recording
copyrights than for musical works copyrights); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 500 (3d
Cir. 2003) (holding the scope of the exemption set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) of the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act was ambiguous, therefore the USCO was empowered by
Congress to interpret the ambiguity of "broadcast" to include Internet streaming).
82 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006).
83 Id.§ 102(a)(7).
84 Id. § 106(4), (6) (stating for a musical work, the copyright owner has the exclusive right to
any type of public performance, while the sound recording copyright owner only has exclusive right
to a public performance via digital transmission).
85 Id.§ 106(4).
86 Id. § 106(4), (6).
87

Id.§ 101.

Pandora Internet Radio, http://www.pandora.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); Press Release,
SIRIUS XM Announces New Programming Launch on Exclusive Oprah Radio (Sept. 10, 2009) (on
file with author). (describing the technology behind the satellite radio service).
88

89 JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC MONEY AND SUCCESS: THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO

MAKING MONEY IN THE Music BUSINESS 31 (5th ed. 2006).

90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(c) (2009) (designating SoundExchange as the performance rights
organization to collect and distribute digital performance royalties for artists and sound recording
copyright owners).
93 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (stating owners of sound recording copyrights do not include analog
public performances).
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2. Licensing Structuresfor Analog and DigitalPublic Performances
Various forms of licenses exist within the music industry, including compulsory
and negotiated. 94 The compulsory or mechanical license under section 115 of the
Copyright Act grants the right to re-record a musical work. 95 A compulsory license
under section 115 applies to analog and digital sales. 96 It requires the licensee to pay
97
the licensor a statutory dollar amount per song per copy reproduced.
Except for limited exceptions, any party that wishes to publically perform a
musical work in the United States must secure a license to do so from ASCAP, BMI,
or SESAC.98 Up until 1971, however, the United States did not recognize a federal
copyright in sound recordings. 99 Congress enacted the Sound Recording Act of 1971
("SRA") to prevent "piracy due to advances in duplicating technology."'100 The act
granted sound recording copyright owners a limited bundle of rights of reproduction,
distribution, and adaptation. 1 1 The act did not grant public performance rights,
under the "presumption that the granted rights would suffice to protect against
02
record piracy."'
In the years following the implementation of the SRA leading up to the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress heard testimony from the Register of Copyrights and
others lobbying for a public performance right for sound recordings. 10 3 Broadcasters
and others who publically performed sound recordings opposed the adoption of such a
right. 0 4 In 1978, the U.S. Copyright Office ("USCO") again recommended a sound
recording public performance right. 10 5 In a report issued to Congress, the USCO
wrote, "[A] sound recording performance right, applicable to all public performances,
would be 'entirely consonant with the basic principles of copyright law generally, and
with those of the 1976 Copyright Act specifically."' 10 6 The USCO recognized that
advancing technology could provide sound recording owners with substantial revenue
07
streams.1
In spite of these recommendations, Congress failed to enact any legislation for
the next 13 years. 08 In 1991, the USCO issued a report that addressed the future of
sound recording copyrights. 10 9
It stated that "[d]igital represents such a
technological advance in sound delivery that it is certain to be the audio transmission
See BRABEC, supra note 89, at 287.
9517 U.S.C. § 115(a).
94
96

Id.

Id. § 115(c). The current rate is 9.1 cents per copy per song or 1.75 cents per minute of
playing, whichever is greater. Mechanical License Royalty Rates, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/
m200a.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Copyright Compulsory License].
98 See BRABEC, supra note 89, at 287.
99See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357 (explaining
the Sound Recording Act of 1971).
97

100

See id.

101 See id.
102 See id.
103See id.
104

See id.

105 See id.
106
107

at 10-11.
See id. at 11.
See id.

108 See id.
109 See id.
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medium of the future." 110 The report recommended, once again, that Congress
extend a public performance right to sound recordings."'
Based on the 1991 USCO report, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property hosted discussions with several groups, including
broadcasters, cable and satellite digital audio service providers, and music copyright
owners, to build consensus over sound recording legislation. 112 Broadcasters lobbied
against adding the right, arguing that the public performance of sound recordings
drove sales of the sound recordings that were being performed. 113 On the other hand,
the sound recording copyright owners argued that digital public performances did not
drive sales, but rather led to music piracy resulting in decreased sales. 114 Balancing
these varying interests, Congress created a digital public performance right for sound
recordings with the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
("DPRSRA").115 Analog performances of sound recordings, in particular traditional
116
radio, were not covered in the Act.
117
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
The DMCA indicated that the "digital audio transmission" included the webcasting
business. 118 This act created a new statutory license that provided a blanket license
to Internet radio stations. 119 This license allowed the Internet radio stations to play
any music without fear of copyright infringement or the burden of having to
negotiate individual licenses from each label group. 120 The DMCA, however, did not
establish a statutory rate for the license. 121 The USCO established the Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel ("CARP") to determine what the royalty rate would be
between 1998-2005.122
The structure for creating statutory royalties proved controversial due to the
resistance of small webcasters to the high licensing fees established by the USCO. 12 3
The Librarian of Congress rejected the rates set by CARP and as a result revised the
rates downward. 124
Congress intervened by enacting the Small Webcaster
Settlement Agreement ("SWSA") of 2002 and by appointing SoundExchange to collect

110 See id. (quoting the 1991 Register of Copyright, Report on Copyright Implications of Digital
Audio Transmission Services).
III See id.
112 See id. at 12.
113 The PerformanceRights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearingon S 227 Before the S.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Steven Randall, owner, Mountain West

Audio Inc., a Muzak affiliate) (stating broadcasters do "not displace sales of prerecorded music, but
rather promotes their sale...").
114 See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357 (explaining
the Sound Recording Act of 1971).
115 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat.
336 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006)).
116 17 U.S.C. § 106.
117 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
118 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)(A).
119 Id. § 114(0.

122

Id.
Id. § 114(0(2)(A).
Id. § 114(f(2)(B).

123
124

See H.R. REP. NO. 111-139, at 2 (2009).
See id.

120
121
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and distribute the royalties. 125 The traditional PRO's were not set up to handle the
additional administrative tasks of paying digital royalties directly to sound recording
owners, so the USCO appointed SoundExchange to collect and distribute all sound
126
recording owners' royalties.
The Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 abolished CARP and
created the Copyright Royalty Board ("CRB").127 In March 2007, the CRB announced
royalty rates for 2006-10.128 Small webcasters did not respond well to these rates
either. 129 As a result, Congress enacted the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, which
gave SoundExchange a limited statutory authority to negotiate and enter into
alternative royalty fee arrangements with webcasters from 2006-10.130 Another
opportunity to negotiate alternative fee arrangements was given to webcasters and
SoundExchange in 2009 through the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009.'3' This act
treated sites differently depending on their size and business model. 32 For example,
it required large Internet radio stations, such as Pandora, to pay the greater of
twenty-five percent of their revenue or a specific fee each time a song is heard. 133
Smaller sites, such as AccuRadio, will be required to pay between twelve to fourteen
percent of revenue in royalties. 134 This is only the latest chapter in the ongoing
135
struggle of digital public performance rights of sound recordings.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Findingthe Nexus Between the PubicPerformanceRight ofDigitalSound
Recordingsand Trademark Use in PaidSearch
Understanding the monetary impact that trademark use in keywords in paid
search has had on trademark owners would help to craft and expedite a solution to
this issue. 136 A comparable lost revenue exigency led to the creation of the
performance right for digital transmissions of sound recordings. 137 Copyright owners

125

37 C.F.R. § 270.5(c) (2009).

126

Id.

127

SeeH.R. REP. NO. 111-139, at 2.

128

See id.

129

See id.

130

See id.
See id.

131

132 See Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed. Reg.
40,614, 40,615, 40,618, 40,622, 40,625-26, (Aug. 12, 2009) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114(f(5)).
133 See id. at 40,615; see also Claire Cain Miller, Music Labels Reach Deal With Internet Radio
Sites, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at B2 (explaining the terms of the Webcaster Settlement Act of
2009).
134 See Claire Cain Miller, supra note 133.
135 See Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed. Reg.
40,614.
136 See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Area Mktg., Inc. No. C-06-2454-MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (describing how campaigns are measured to assess potential damages
through clicks and impressions).
137 See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 14 (1995), reprintedin1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 361 (explaining
the Sound Recording Act of 1971).
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of sound recordings quantified their revenue loss through lost CD sales. 138 No party
has quantified trademark owners' lost revenue and decrease in value of their marks
due to competitors' use of their marks as keywords in paid search. 139 Trademark
owners generally believe that this use results in lost sales, but no hard data exists to
back up this assertion. 140 The loss to the trademark owner becomes harder to
quantify because this use can decrease brand value, public perception of a mark, and
the goodwill that a party has garnered for its mark.141 U.S. courts do not have clear
guidance from the Lanham Act regarding trademark use as keywords in search
engine advertising programs. 142 The solution to clarify this gray area in the law lies
within the United States Supreme Court or Congress. 143 The Supreme Court could
interpret the Lanham Act as banning the use of another entities' trademark in
keywords in paid search programs altogether. 144 Alternatively, Congress could
address this issue as it did with digital transmissions of sound recordings by bringing
the Lanham Act up to date with technology and providing an additional revenue
145
stream for trademark owners.
As two forms of intellectual property, copyrights and trademarks possess
different protection needs in the digital space. 146 The similarities of the struggles,
however, to keep the respective intellectual property statutes current with
technological advances and how consumers encounter copyrights and trademarks
through technology is strikingly similar. 147 At the crux of the issue for both copyright
and trademark owners lies the issue of lost revenues. 148 These similarities provide a
foundation to begin the analysis of how the evolution of the copyright royalty
structure for digital transmissions of sound recordings can be applied to the current

138

See id.

139But see Storus Corp., 2008 WL 449835, at *4. Aroa had purchased Storus' mark as a
keyword as well as used the mark in its Google AdWords ad copy. Id. Storus provided the court
with metrics around how many times the ad appeared (impressions) as well as how many times the
ad was clicked on (click-through-rate). Id. The court accepted the click-through-rate to "establish
the requisite use." Id. at *6.
140 See Mark Bartholomew, Making a Mark in the InternetEconomy: A TrademarkAnalysis
of Search Engine Advertising, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 179, 196 (2005) (describing the need for more
empirical evidence to show the impact of trademark use as keywords in paid search).
141See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(2004) (describing the value of trademarks in the digital marketplace).
142See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2009) ("It would be
helpful for Congress to study and clear up this ambiguity.").
143See id.
144See, e.g., H.B. 450, 2009 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009) (proposing the ban of the use of trademarks
as keywords within a "qualified interactive information service" within the state of Utah).
145See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2006); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
TOUGH NEW REALITIES THAT COULD MAKE OR BREAK YOUR BUSINESS 127 (Penguin Books 2007)
(describing how trademark owners need to lobby Congress for additional rights in a similar manner
in which copyright owners went to Congress).
146See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 127.
147See id.
148See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprintedin1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357 (explaining
the purpose of giving sound recording copyright owners copyright protection was to protect their
livelihood in light of new technology development); Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (showing potential lost revenue by diverted
clicks).
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trademark use issues within new technology and how to appropriately compensate
149
trademark owners.

B. DigitalPublicPerformanceRights and Licenses
1. Issues that Causedthe DigitalPublic PerformanceRight for Sound Recording
Copyright Owners to Come Into Being
The public performance right for sound recording copyright owners went
150
through a similar evolution that trademark law is currently experiencing.
Throughout the life of the 1909 Copyright Act, analog formats such as player pianos,
jukeboxes, and radio were the primary media available for public performances of
sound recordings. 151 Per the Copyright Act of 1976, the owner of a sound recording
does not have the exclusive right to a public performance of the recording. 152 The
historic reasoning behind this was that the public performance was essentially
advertising for the owner of the sound recording, which led to more sales of the sound
recording (in hard copy-usually CD format), thus allowing the owner of the sound
153
recording to get paid.
Advances in technology reframed this traditional model. 15 4 Initially, duplicating
technology allowed consumers to obtain copies of sound recordings without
purchasing them. 155 This traditional model was further disrupted by the availability
of high-quality versions of songs over satellite or cable systems, sometimes on
demand. 156 Next, and more significantly, downloading and streaming music over the
Internet made sound recordings available through means that did not promote CD
sales. 157
The owner of a sound recording did not receive remuneration for
performances of his works streamed or downloaded over the Internet, legally or
illegally. 158 A website could provide a sound recording to the end user, who then had
the ability to capture this recording onto his own computer or listening device and

149 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006)).
150 See BRABEC, supra note 89, at 107.
151 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 107, 111-12 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5727 (explaining an issue that dealt with the public performance right for jukebox
performances of sound recordings).
152 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
153 See, e.g., The Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearingon S. 227
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Steven Randall, owner,

Mountain West Audio Inc., a Muzak affiliate).
154 See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 14 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 361 (explaining
that copyright law was inadequate to deal with the public performance ramifications of new
technologies).
155 See id. at 13-14.

156 See id.

at 14.

See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 (2005)
(stating that peer-to-peer networks were used to share and download copyrighted works without
compensating the sound recording copyright owner for the public performance).
157

158 See, e.g.,

id.
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circumvent any payment requirement for the sound recording. 159 This caused
16°
copyright owners of sound recordings to seek additional protection.
Sound recording owners were losing CD sales and not being paid for the public
performances of digital transmissions of their music. 16 1 The theory that the analog
public performance promotes sales has validity. 162 The sales-leader argument
becomes substantially weaker, however, relative to digital public performances. 163
When an FM radio station broadcasts a sound recording, the only way a listener can
obtain a copy of that sound recording is to record the actual transmission. 164 This
practice is cumbersome and most likely results in a poor-quality recording. 165 To
obtain a quality copy of the recording, a consumer must either purchase a hard copy
of it or purchase an electronic copy via a service such as iTunes. 166 Traditional
analog radio, therefore, helps to drive sales. 167 On the other hand, when the sound
recording is performed publicly in a digital format, the listener can easily capture on
a computer a precise replication of the sound recording. 168 The issues of access or
169
timing no longer exist with a digital public performance.
The sound recording copyright owners' outcry led to the creation of the digital
public performance right. 170 This created a new revenue stream for sound recording
owners. 171 Copyright law grants the copyright owner a bundle of exclusive rights on
his copyrights. 172 The copyright owner may choose to not allow anyone to use the
work, or may choose to freely allow anyone to use it, with or without compensation. 173
Congress intervened regarding the digital public performances of sound
recordings when it realized that the Copyright Act as applied to the marketplace
presented an unfair situation for sound recording owners. 174
Congressional
159

See id.

160 See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357 (explaining
that sound recording copyright owners testified before Congress in favor of a public performance

right).
161

See id

162See The Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995." Hearingon S. 227Before the

S. Comm. on the Judiciary 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Steven Randall, owner, Mountain
West Audio Inc., a Muzak affiliate).
163See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 U.S. at 920 (showing the digital access to
copyrighted works via peer-to-peer file sharing in this case can easily infringe the owner's rights).
164See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 11 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 358 (explaining
how digital technology created new opportunities to capture sound recordings).

165See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073
(9th Cir. 1999) (explaining how sound quality degenerates with each successive recording from an
analog source).
166See id.
167See, e.g., The Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearingon

S. 227
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Steven Randall, owner,
Mountain West Audio Inc., a Muzak affiliate).
168See Recording lndus.Assn ofAm., 180 F.3d at 1073.
169 See id.

170See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357
(explaining the purpose of giving sound recording copyright owners copyright protection
was to protect their livelihood in light of new technology).
17117 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006).
172 Id.
173Id.
174Id.
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intervention is not necessary to make the law comply with every advance in
technology. 175 In some instances, the market will normalize whatever impact the
technology has had on the rights holder or the courts will interpret the existing law
176
relating to new technology.
In the realm of digital music, the marketplace in the mid-1990s was broken, with
the rights holders losing sales. 177 A culture of theft had embedded itself into the
marketplace, and without legislative and judicial intervention, the rights holders
would not have received compensation. 178 In granting a public performance right for
digital transmissions of sound recordings, Congress gave sound recording owners a
new revenue stream. 179 This new revenue stream, however, created a complicated
new set of problems. 180 Congress had to set a fair royalty rate and establish a system
to collect and pay out the royalties. 181 Congress enacted CARP in 1998, and replaced
it with CRB in 2002 to solve these issues. 182 Congress then allowed SoundExchange
to negotiate alternative royalty rates in 2009.183 The primary issue with the rates
has been the impact on the long tail of the digital music marketplace-the small
webcasters who could potentially have had to pay more in royalties than their
Internet radio stations brought in. 184 A new rate plan that offered fair rates to small
185
webcasters was established in 2009 with the assistance of SoundExchange.
When this public performance right first came into place, the existing PRO's,
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, were in the business of handling public performance
royalties for musical works. 186 SoundExchange, on the other hand, provides sound
recording owners accurate data relative to the sound recordings performed in the
digital realm, including what work, when it was performed, and how many times it
was performed. 187 SoundExchange already collected a royalty for other types of
technology that came preloaded with copyrighted works. 188 Therefore, the USCO

175See Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrightsin the Age ofMultimedia, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER

& TECH. L.J. 351 (1995) (discussing how contracts may be used to deal with licensing issues arising
out of new technologies).
176See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (explaining
that the Court must interpret the existing law without explicit guidance from Congress).
177See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 14 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 361 ("[C]urrent
copyright law is inadequate to address all of the issues raised by these new technologies dealing
with the digital transmission of sound recordings .... ").
178 See id.; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 (2005).
17917 U.S.C. § 114(0 (2006).
180 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-139, at 2 (2009) (stating the rates for digital performance of sound
recordings proved difficult to negotiate for webcasters and sound recording owners).
181 See id.
182See id.

183 See Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed. Reg.
40,614, 40,615, 40,618, 40,622, 40,625-26, (Aug. 12, 2009) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114(f(5))

(explaining the various rate structures negotiated for different types of webcasters).
184See H.R. REP. NO. 111-139, at 2.
185Id.

186See BRABEC, supra note 89, at 31.
187SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com

(follow "About" hyperlink; then follow

"Royalty Distribution and SX Methodology" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (explaining the
data source collection methodology) [hereinafter "SoundExchange"].
188See id. (follow "About" hyperlink).
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appointed SoundExchange as the PRO for all digital transmissions and public
9
performances of copyrighted sound recordings18
Overall, it took almost twenty-five years for sound recording owners to obtain a
recognized public performance right from the time they were first granted a
copyright in their sound recordings.1 90 It appears that the trademark use in
keywords debate is heading down a similar path in terms of the time it is taking to
figure out how to respond to the rights owners.' 91

C. Trademark Use in Keywords Through PaidSearch Today
The majority of U.S. courts have held that the purchase of a trademark as a
keyword through paid search constitutes a use in commerce; however, to date, none
have held this use to constitute a likelihood of confusion.192
The litigation
surrounding this issue can be attributed, at least in part, to the evolution of
technology that allows companies to market their goods by using their trademarks as
keywords in paid search programs. 193 Search engines like Google and Yahoo! have
provided new business models in the advertising space that allow advertisers to
narrowly target their audiences through the search engine's technology.19 4 Given
these practices, search engine marketing has created challenges for trademark
owners to protect their marks. 195 Trademarks are bought and sold from business to
business as keywords without consumers knowing about this practice.19 6 This has
created the potential for confusion because consumers are not aware that the mark is
being used by the competitor. 197 The confusion can occur with the end user believing
189 See 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(b-c) (2009).
190 See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10-13 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357-360
(describing the general history of the sound recording copyright).
191 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (showing that more
than 10 years after the first cases dealing with trademark use as keywords, courts still have not
come to consensus as to the state of the law, and are still acting without Congressional direction).
192 See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131 (overturning the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs
keyword trademark infringement claims against defendant for failure to demonstrate use in
commerce; however also stating that it was not for the court to judge as to whether the practice is
confusing); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.N.J.
2006) (holding use of the competitor's mark on the Internet by purchasing the mark as a keyword
was in commerce and was in connection with goods or services under 15 U.S.C. § 1127); Edina
Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. 04-4371, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar.
20, 2006) (holding the plaintiffs mark was used commercially when sold as a keyword and in
general, based on the plain meaning of the Lanham Act, the purchase of search terms is a use in
commerce); GoVt Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004)
("[W]hen defendants sell the rights to link advertising to plaintiffs trademarks, defendants are
using the trademarks in commerce in a way that may imply that defendants have permission from
the trademark holder to do so.").
193 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 145, at 125.
194 See J.G. Wentworth v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (explaining Google's AdWords program).
195 See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131.
196 See, e.g., JG. Wentworth, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288, at *17.
197See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'n, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that using a competitor's trademark in metatags is likely to cause initial interest
confusion).
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the trademark owner sanctioned the site, or that the trademark owner is connected
with the site the end user lands on. 198 While the majority of U.S. courts have held
that trademark use in paid search keywords is a use in commerce, the issue of
whether this use has created a likelihood of confusion within the Lanham Act has yet
to be determined in any case. 199

1. Impact of CurrentIssues to the PaidSearch Industry and Trademark Owner
Search engines claim it is not their responsibility to police trademark use within
keywords.2 00 In the U.S. Google, for example, does not restrict any trademark use in
relation to keywords or copy.20 1 Yahoo! and Bing, on the other hand, restrict
2 02
trademark use to fair uses, descriptive or resellers.
The monetary impact of this issue on the trademark owner can be quantified
through damages awarded in court cases; however, most cases have settled out of
court, with few allotting for damages. 20 3 Another method of quantifying the impact is
to measure key performance indicators ("KPI") of the keyword in question. 20 4 The
court in Storus Corp. v. Aroa Marketing measured the impact of the infringing
activity by looking at the number of impressions and clicks generated by the
infringing advertisement. 20 5 A method also exists to view conversions, which are the
clicks that result in sales. 206 By measuring conversions by use of the keyword in
sponsored search results, it is possible to quantify the monetary impact trademark
20 7
use in keywords can have on the trademark owner.
In search engine marketing where companies bid on keywords, typically the
more popular keywords cost more than less popular keywords. 20 8 This presents a
classic case of supply and demand. 20 9 If a trademark owner bids on his own mark as
198See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(stating when trademarks are used as links in advertising, an implication exists that the trademark
owner has given permission for the use).
199See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131 (remanding to the district court to determine whether the
practice of trademark use in keywords within paid search is confusing).
200 Compare Yahoo! Trademarks, supra note 35, and Microsoft Ad Content Guidelines, supra
note 35, with Google AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note supra note 35.
201 See Google AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 35.
202 See Yahoo! Trademarks, supra note 35; Microsoft Ad Content Guidelines, supra note 35.
203See Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32450, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (holding use in commerce but did not adjudicate
consumer confusion and parties settled); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. 04-4371, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (holding use in commerce but did not
adjudicate consumer confusion and parties settled); Gov't Employees Ins., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704
(holding use in commerce, but the parties subsequently settled).
204 See Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454-MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (stating the court looked at the impressions and clicks as an indicator of the
infringing impact).
205See id.
206 See STEPHANIE DIAMOND, WEB MARKETING FOR SMALL BUSINESSES: 7 STEPS TO EXPLOSIVE

BUSINESS GROWTH 112 (Sourcebooks 2008) (defining conversions).
207 See id. at 168 (explaining how to track online campaign results through conversions).
208 See id. at 152 (explaining that generic keywords cost more than niche keywords).
209 See id.
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a keyword and his competitor also bids on that same mark as a keyword, the cost of
that keyword rises.2l ° This situation raises the advertising price for the trademark
2 11
owner for his own mark within the search engine sponsored advertising space.
This situation can cause companies to have to bid on their own brand name terms to
reduce consumer confusion within search engines, even though they may normally
212
not spend their marketing dollars in that way.
The situation that the company Rosetta Stone has confronted concerning the use
of its trademarks in paid search constitutes a vivid example of this scenario.2 13 The
company actively chose to not use its trademarks within search engine marketing;
however, they were savvy enough to understand that competitors were using their
trademarks in search engine marketing to sell either competing products or
counterfeit products online.2 14 Rosetta Stone began to bid on its own trademarks in
order to outrank the competitors or counterfeiters within the sponsored links section
of a search engine results page.215 Not only does Rosetta Stone have to pay to protect
its marks, it has to pay a premium because it competes with a competitor to use its
216
own marks.

2. InformationIndexing for NaturalResults vs. Payingfor the Indexingin the
Sponsored Links
The Lanham Act does not expressly make a party liable for using another's
trademark as an information indexing tool. 217 In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.
West Coast Entertainment Corp., the court held that the embedded use of a
trademark name and site name in metatags was sufficient to create a likelihood of
confusion. 218 At the time of this case, search engines used metatags as an indexing
tool to rank the organic results. 219 Two fundamental shifts have occurred in web
advertising since this case.22 0 First, major search engines no longer use metatags for
indexing natural search rankings.2 21 This reduces the impact of using a trademark
210

See Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, The Search Engine Advertising Market:
Lucrative Space or Trademark Liabhity, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 223, 229 (2009) (describing
factors that impact the cost of a keyword).
211 See id.
212 See Complaint at 52, Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google, Inc., No. 1:09cv736 (E.D. Va. July 10,
2009) (complaining that Google's practice of allowing non-trademark owners to bid on the Rosetta

Stone mark as a keyword forced Rosetta Stone to also purchase this mark, and advertise on Google,
"to reduce the likelihood that web users will be diverted to other websites").

See id.
See id.
215 See id.
216 See id. at 67.
217 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1347 (2008).
218 174 F.3d 1036, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
219 See id. at 1045.
220 See Mark A. Thurmon, Recent Developments in Trademark Law, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 41-42 (2009) (describing current search engine technology).
221 See id. at 42 ("[Clourts ... ignore what Google and others have said over and over again:
keyword meta-tags are not indexed by Google and, therefore, have no impact on search results
obtained using Google.").
213

214
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in a metatag. 222 Second, the trademark use issue has gone from use within metatags
for natural search result indexing to use as keywords within paid search results.223
When a trademark is used in metatags for organic rankings, the trademark is not
paid for by the party using the mark and consumers do not see or interact with the
224
trademark.
A debate exists regarding the scope of trademark owners' control over their
marks in paid search. 225 One side argues that mark owners possess a property right
in their mark, and therefore should retain tight controls over the mark's use. 226 The
other side of the debate argues that such controls would result in a world where
consumers cannot obtain access to all relevant information. 227 Natural search results
are a combination of the quality score of the website within the search engine and a
proprietary algorithm that the engine uses to rank the sites based on consumer
interaction. 228 Consumers, in general, get the most relevant links within the natural
229
search results when using a search engine.
The relevancy of the results in the sponsored links is a completely different
matter. 230 Google argues that its AdWords program creates relevant search results
in its sponsored links because parties pay a fee to appear in this section. 231 Google
claims it changed its AdWords policy to allow trademark usage in copy in order to
offer more relevant search results to consumers. 232 This argument has flaws. 233 The
sponsored links results cost advertisers money. 234 Unless every single entity on the
Internet advertises on Google, the company could not possibly give consumers the

222
223

See id.
See id at 42-46.

224 See JERRY LEE FORD, JR. & WILLIAM R. STANEK, INCREASE YOUR WEB TRAFFIC IN A
WEEKEND 46-47 (Thomson Course Technology, 5th ed. 2008) (explaining how meta data is used

within a website).
225 See Dogan, supra note 217, at 1345 (2008) ("The debate over 'trademark use' has become a
hot-button issue in intellectual property... law.").
226 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2009) (offering an
example of a mark owner asserting that it should retain exclusive control of its mark in paid
search).
227 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:
Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOwA L. REV. 1597, 1640 n.181 (2007) (stating opposition to absolute property
rights by trademark owners).
228 See DIAMOND, supra note 206, at 149 (explaining how natural listings are displayed within
search engines).
229 See id.
230 See Miguel Helft, Companies Object to Google's Policyon Trademarks,N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2009, at Bi (offering Google's acknowledgment that relevancy of sponsored links is a different
matter than those in the organic listings).
231 See id
232 See id.
233 But see Mike Gordon & Peppi Kiviniemi, Google Wins Ground in Ad Case, WALL ST. J.,

Sept. 23, 2009, at B6 ("Internet users expect more information to be returned as a result of a search
than just the products of the firms that own the trademarks.").
234 See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454-MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (discussing how parties pay to place ads within Google's AdWords).
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most relevant searches within the sponsored links section. 235 The more relevant
236
links appear in the natural results of the search.
When an advertiser pays to appear within Google's sponsored links, it does not
create a "relevant" result. 237 Rather, it simply creates a result that is relevant to the
price that the term garnered in the marketplace. 238 A consequence of Google
expanding its policy is that the prices for branded or trademarked keywords will be
higher by allowing more companies to bid on them. 239 Google stands to increase its
240
revenue by opening the flood gates on trademark use within its AdWords program.
This practice, however, will lead to trademark owners having significantly less
241
control over the use of their marks in the paid search marketplace.
Just as owners of sound recordings faced significant legal hurdles with procuring
digital public performance rights, trademark owners are confronted with myriad
obstacles in protecting their rights within paid search. 242 These range from whether
the use of a trademark as a keyword constitutes a use in commerce, to whether it
rises to the level of likelihood of confusion, to ancillary issues such as trademark use
within the ad copy text. 243 My proposal aims to rectify this issue by monetizing the
244
system through a licensing model.

III. PROPOSAL
The issues facing trademark owners today on the Internet should lead to new
legislation similar to how the outcry of sound recording copyright owners led to
legislation that resulted in a new right and revenue stream for the copyright
owner. 245 The legislation can do one of two things. First, it could ban the use of a

235 See DIAMOND, supra note 206, at 149 (explaining that Google's natural results are relevant
because Google uses proprietary technology that indexes the vast majority of web pages).

236

See id.

237 See id.
28

See GREGORY H. SISKIND, DEBORAH MCMURRAY & RICHARD P. KLAU, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE
TO MARKETING ON THE INTERNET 124-25 (American Bar Association, 3d ed. 2007) (explaining the
factors that impact the cost of clicks).
289 See Helft, supra note 230 (quoting a digital marketing executive who asserted that the new
policy will raise the cost of bids on brand terms).
240 See id.
241 See id. (showing advertisers' resentment at the increased ability of third parties to bid on
their marks as keywords).
242 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (overturning the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs keyword trademark infringement claims against defendant for
failure to demonstrate use in commerce; however also stating that it was not for the court to judge
as to whether the practice is confusing); Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454-MMC, 2008
WL 449835, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (holding that Aroa infringed Storus' trademark by using
the mark in the copy of the advertisement within its Google AdWords program).
243 See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131; Storus, 2008 WL 449835, at *7.
244 See discussion infra Part III.
245 See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357 (explaining
the purpose of giving sound recording copyright owners copyright protection was to protect their
livelihood in light of new technology).
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competitor's trademark as keywords in paid search programs altogether. 246
Alternatively, it could create a model that allows purchasers of other entities'
trademarks as keywords in paid search programs to use those marks in a
Congressionally regulated fashion in a similar way section 114 of the Copyright Act
247
regulates the digital public performance of sound recordings and royalty payments.
I propose the second option. If Congress legislated a royalty structure for the
use of a competitor's trademark as keywords in paid search, it would face many
issues similar to those it worked through regarding the performance right for digital
transmissions of sound recordings. 248
These include how the rate should be
measured, to whom and for what the fees should apply, who should collect the rate,
249
and who is responsible for enforcing this system.

A. Setting andApplying a Rate Structure
The fee for using a keyword in paid search should apply to any party that
purchases a trademarked keyword for use of that keyword within paid search.2 50 The
rate could be calculated several different ways: 1) percent of the click cost of the
trademarked keyword25 1 ; 2) flat fee per click 2 5 2 ; 3) flat fee per thousand
impressions2 5 3; or 4) flat fee based on a blanket license.2 54 The United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO") would have to enforce the rate structure in a
similar manner that the Copyright Royalty Board enforces the digital public
2 55
performance royalty rate structure.

1. Percentof Click Cost of the TrademarkedKeyword
For this rate system, when a party places a bid on a trademarked keyword, a
percent of the cost of that keyword would go back to the trademark owner as a
royalty or licensing fee for the use of that trademark. 256 In general, search engines
246

See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'n, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir.

1999) (holding use of a competitor's trademark in the metatags of one's website is likely to cause
confusion and is "exactly what the trademark laws are designed to prevent").
247
248

See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2006).
See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2-8 (1998) (describing the process Congress worked through to

create a digital public performance sound recording right).
249 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 261.3-.4 (2009) (explaining the royalty fees for public performance of
sound recordings and the structure and terms for collection and distribution of the royalties).
250 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 124-25 (describing paid search programs).
251 See id. (discussing the cost-per-click form of payment method in online advertising).
252 See BRABEC, supra note 89, at 287 (stating that the fees for blanket licenses for musical
works can be a flat fee).
253 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 127 (describing what cost per impressions ("CPM") is and

how advertisers use the model).
254 See MICHAEL A. ACZON, THE MuSICIAN'S LEGAL COMPANION 34-35 (Course Technology, 2d
ed. 2008) (describing blanket licenses and how they are used to license small performance copyrights
through the PRO's).
255 See 17 U.S.C § 801(b)(1) (2006) (defining the duties of the Copyright Royalty Board).
256 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 124-25 (discussing the cost-per-click form of payment
method in online advertising).
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and SEM firms collect the required information for this structure based on the
common cost per click ("CPC") model and could likely report on the specific
trademarked terms.2 5 7 The CPC model allows for the advertiser to run its ad on a
search engine but only pay for the ad if a consumer clicks on it.258 This rate structure
is popular within SEM firms and advertisers because firms can manage an
advertiser's budget to a narrow ROI range that the advertiser sets.2 5 9 In addition,
2 60
search engines, SEM firms, and advertisers are familiar with this system.
Because the advertiser only pays for the click cost if the ad is clicked on, the
trademark owner would only be paid each time the ad clicked on is triggered by the
trademarked keyword.26 1 The CPC model allows the market to determine the
number of clicks the term gets and a percentage-based model allows for the market to
determine the amount of fees collected by the trademark owner. 26 2 If the cost of a
trademarked keyword goes up or down, so would the trademark owner's fee.
This model would likely require additional administrative work by the entity
that would collect and distribute the fees. 26 3 The entity would need to possess the
ability to separate the trademarked terms from non-trademarked terms in order to
calculate which trademarked terms were clicked on and what the number of clicks
2 64
were, as well as whether the owner bid on that term or another person or entity.
The larger search engines currently have technology that separates out the
trademarked terms from the generic terms as it is in use today to determine the costs
of the trademarked vs. generic keywords to either the advertiser directly or the SEM
firm. 26 5 Depending on the platform used, some SEM firms also have this capability
as they sometimes offer varying fee structures for trademarked vs. generic
2 66
keywords.

2. FlatFee Per Click of the TrademarkedKeyword
A flat fee per click system would charge a flat rate per click of a trademarked
term, regardless of the cost of the keyword.2 67 This model varies from the percent of
the trademarked keyword cost because this structure is a flat fee per click, regardless
of the cost of the keyword or click.2 6 8 In this model, the market would not determine
257. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (explaining the way DoubleClick, the largest Internet advertising service provider at the time,
collected and stored data from users of DoubleClick affiliated websites).
258 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 124-25.
259 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 143 (describing how a program may be run to a specific ROI
set by an advertiser).
260 See, e.g.,In re DoubleCh'ck, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
261 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 124-25.
262 See id.
263 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(b-c) (2009).
264 See id.
265 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 124-25.
266 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y.

2001).
267 See BRABEC, supra note 89, at 287 (stating that the fees for blanket licenses for musical
works can be a flat fee).
268 See id.
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the flat fee per click; however, it would drive the number of clicks each trademarked
term received, thus having an impact on the fees generated for the trademark
269
owner.
The same administrative issues within the percent of click cost model apply to
this model. 270 The difference is how the fee itself is calculated, which is less of a
271
technological issue and more of an accounting issue that is easily solved.

3. FlatFee PerImpressionsof the TrademarkedKeyword
A flat fee per impressions would charge a flat fee for each time an ad is
generated under the sponsored links section as a result of a trademarked keyword
search. 272 A cost per thousand impressions ("CPM") model is used primarily for
advertisers that are looking for brand awareness or are lead generators, and not
necessarily online retailers. 273 The impressions are the important factor for these
advertisers, as they simply want their message to get to as many consumers as
possible, within the confines of their budget and target audiences. 274
The
impressions are measured and priced by the thousand. 275 The number of impressions
276
is typically exponentially greater than the number of clicks.
The trademark owner's fee per impression would likely be much lower than the
fee per click, but the quantity of impressions much higher. 277 This balances the
278
resulting fee to the trademark owner to be similar to the flat-fee-per-click model.
The market impact is different than the per click model. Since the key indicator is
impressions and not clicks, the driver of the fee is not the click-through rate but
rather simply the search itself on that keyword. 279 This means that if the consumer
searches on a specific keyword but immediately looks at something else on the page,
the trademark owner would still be compensated if his sponsored link showed up in
280
the results.
The threshold for the trademark owner being paid is much lower based on
market demand than that of the flat-fee-per-click model. 28 1 The search engine and
cost per keyword drive the eventual success for the advertiser more so than market
demand. 282 If two advertisers bid on the same trademarked term, the cost of the

269

See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 124-26 (describing how the market impacts advertisers'

cost for keywords).

See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(b-c) (2009).
See id.
272 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 127 (explaining how cost per impression advertising is used
in the marketplace).
270
271

278
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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keyword will continue to rise until the bidding ends. 28 3 The impression that the
consumer ultimately sees is primarily based on the fact that the advertiser paid more
for the search term than the other party. 28 4 Thus, the cost of the keyword should
come into play when calculating the trademark owner's fee for this model. 28 5 The
same administrative and market impact factors apply to this model as the flat fee per
286
click model.

4. FlatFee Based on a Blanket License
A blanket license would be an annual license issued through a centralized
organization similar to SoundExchange for the digital sound recording public
performance royalty.2 87 This could consist of a flat-rate minimum fee for the use of
the trademarked keyword. 288 The system could consist of a tiered rate structure
based on the market value of the keyword, on the market demand of the keyword, or
28 9
the size of the organization that owns the trademarked keyword.
This model could mirror the set-up of the Small Webcaster's Settlement
Agreement of 2009 ("SWSA") regarding the digital sound recording public
performance royalty. 290 The SWSA allows smaller webcasters to play music over the
Internet without being cost prohibitive, but still provides a royalty to the sound
recording owners of the webcast. 291 It sets up a model that allows webcasters to
negotiate a rate with SoundExchange somewhat based on the webeaster's own
revenue stream. 292 The SWSA fee ends up being anywhere from twelve to twentyfive percent of the advertising revenue of the webcaster. 293 This rate structure could
be mimicked in the paid search market.
Search engine marketing firms are ideally situated to collect this type of fee and
administer the payments to the trademark owners. 294 SEM firms work with multiple
search engines, already collect the data needed for payment (regardless of the rate
model adopted), and have relationships with many advertisers involved in these
types of transactions. 295 Regardless of the type of firm that would administer these
royalties, it would need to be a non-profit, Congressionally sanctioned organization,

283

See id.

See id.
See id.
286 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(b-c) (2009).
287 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2006) (laying forth the blanket license for digital public performance
284
285

of sound recordings).
288

See Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed. Reg.

40,614, 40,615, 40,618, 40,622, 40,625-26, (Aug. 12, 2009) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (f)(5)).
289

See id.

See id
See id
292 See id.
293 See id, see also Miller, supranote 133.
294 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(discussing the business structure of DoubleClick, an SEM firm).
295 See id at 502.
290
291
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similar to what SoundExchange is today to the digital public performance royalty
o6
administration

B. Compulsory Use vs. CompulsoryRate Structure
Another issue Congress must address is whether the use of the trademark or the
2 97
I
rate or rate structure imposed on the trademark use should be compulsory.
propose that the rate should be compulsory but the use optional.

1. Compulsory Use and Rate
Compulsory use of a trademark would mean that the trademark owner could not
298
prevent another entity from bidding on and using its trademark in paid search.
This would also mean that a rate for the use of the trademark as the keyword would
be compulsory.2 99 While this model works well in copyright for mechanical licensing,
it would probably not bode well in the trademark world where likelihood of confusion
is the primary concern.3 00 The inherent value in a trademark is that no person or
company may use it without the owner's permission (fair use exceptions aside) due to
the public perception and goodwill that the mark is determined to represent and the
potential likelihood of confusion that may ensue from another's use.30 1 If the use of
the mark were compulsory, this would essentially impinge on the owner's most basic
30 2
rights within the mark to protect their own market perception and goodwill.

2. CompulsoryRate Only
Another possible solution is to make only the rate compulsory, not the use. 303 If
an advertiser wanted to use another entity's trademark as a keyword in a search, the
trademark owner would need to give permission, but would not be able to set the
30 5
rate. 30 4 The rate would be legislatively set, per one of the models explained above.
This model would require a centralized organization to administer the licenses
between trademark owners and the licensees. 306 While potential licensees could
track down trademark owners individually, this would be an impracticable and cost
See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(b-c) (2009).
See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (setting forth the compulsory license for making and distributing
musical works).
296

297
298

See id.

See id.
See id. § 1114 (setting forth likelihood of confusion as the primary element for trademark
infringement).
301 See id.
299
300

302

See id.

See, e.g., Copyright Compulsory License, supra note 97 (describing the compulsory license
rates for recording and distributing musical works).
303

304 See, e.g.,

id.

See, e.g., id.
306 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(b-c) (2009).
305
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prohibitive practice for licensees to undertake. 307 An organization would need to be
established for the licensing and royalty structure that would administer the licenses
and royalties, similar to the function that SoundExchange provides in the digital
308
public performance royalty administration.

3. Administering a CompulsoryModel
Regardless of whether the use and rate are compulsory or just the rate, this
proposed model would result in increased administrative needs for both search
engine marketing firms and search engines. 309 Both entities would need to enhance
their technologies that currently differentiate between a trademarked term and a
non-trademarked term to also delineate a licensed trademarked term from and a
310
non-licensed trademarked term.
An additional issue emerges when deciding who would police the use: the
centralized agency that handles the licensing, the search engine, the search engine
marketing firm, or the trademark owner. 311 This management issue should be
determined based on the technology that is developed to track the use and where that
312
technology resides.

C ForProfit or Pass-ThroughRate?
In light of the additional resources required to administer any of these
monetized models, a consideration is whether the fee, regardless of structure or
compulsory nature, is for profit for the entity that administers this structure or a
straight pass-through of the royalties (less administrative fees) to the trademark
3 13
owner.

1. ForProfit
If the rate were for profit, the first question is who receives the profit. 314 The
trademark owner would receive the rate itself. 315 The profit would seemingly go to
the organization that administered the rates, licenses, or meets the general needs of
307
308

See id.
See id.

309 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500, 504-05
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing current administrative tactics to support an advertiser's campaign).
310 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing
the scope of Google's AdWords technology which currently does not include this additional
technology).
311 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 261.4(b-c) (choosing SoundExchange as the receiving and designated
agent for royalties of digital public performance of sound recordings).

312 See id.
313 See id.

314 See BRABEC, supra note 89, at 290 (stating that SESAC is a for-profit performance rights
organization).
315 See id.
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the structure adopted. 316 The search engines, however, would likely want a cut of
this profit, if the bulk of the model's success relied on their technology to aggregate
the data needed to administer the model. 317 The profit would likely go to the firm or
engine that developed the technology which allowed for the management of the
318
licensed trademarked keywords within paid search.
The second question is at what percentage this profit would be set. 319 The
market could determine the profit if it were a set margin or markup of the cost of the
keyword. 320 The more demand for the keyword, the higher the cost, and the higher
321
the cost, the more profit would be generated.
Congress would need to determine whether the rate would include a profit or
portion for the administrative entity, or whether this profit would be set by the entity
that administered the model. 322 This would likely drive the cost of the keyword up,
323
and possibly make it cost prohibitive to license the trademark to use as a keyword.

2. Pass Through Model
A pass through model sets a rate for the trademark owner, but allows for a
324
percentage of the rate to be withheld by the administering entity to cover its costs.
325
This would essentially make the administering entity a non-profit organization.
326
The percentage withheld would be legislated to make it a standardized amount.
This may increase the costs of the legislated rate, but likely not as much as a
potential for-profit model. 327 This model would allow trademark owners to take
control of the use of their mark. 328 They may choose to not allow anyone to use it as a
keyword, or may choose to allow other companies to license the mark. 329 Companies
should have the right to opt out of allowing other companies to license their mark,
and they should not lose the right to litigate infringing uses of their mark. 330
Essentially, a trademark would not be able to be used as a keyword unless the owner
of the trademark grants permission through a license. 331
316

317
318
319

See id.
See id.

See id.
See id.

320 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 125 (explaining how the market determines the cost per
click in paid search).
321 See id.
322 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2006) (describing the structure for royalty payments from digital
sound recording transmissions).
323 See SISKIND, supra note 238, at 125.
324 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (offering SoundExchange two-and-a-half percent of the royalty fee as
an administrative fee).
325 See id.
326 See id.
327 See id.
328 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (indicating that a trademark owner must consent to the use of his
mark by a third party, otherwise the third party potentially infringes the mark if he uses it in
commerce).
329 See id.
330 See id.
331 See id.
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This licensing model would not change the fair uses of trademarks in keywords,
but would attempt to define them better. 3 2 Currently, courts determine the fair use
based upon the facts specific to the case. 333 This legislation would clarify this use so
3 34
as to delineate it from the license requirement.

D. Counter-Arguments to this PaidSearch LicensingSystem
The primary issue presented by these proposals is why a company would choose
to license its mark for use in paid search. 335 The solutions proposed are primarily
aimed at the "long tail" within the paid search industry.3 36 This segment comprises
advertisers who pay a minimum amount of money to maintain a presence online
within paid search.3 37 They may manage their paid search program in-house or work
with a smaller SEM firm to handle it for them for a minimal fee. 338
These
advertisers would not necessarily litigate the use of their trademarks, or possibly
even know that other companies are using their marks. 339
If the advertiser does not know about this activity, he may not be able to stop
it.340
If he is unaware of it, then the tendency is to think that the impact to his
business is minimal.3 41 But this is not necessarily the case. When SoundExchange
began to administer the digital public performance royalty system, an issue emerged
with sound recording copyright owners not claiming their royalties.3 42 A similar
situation may be happening with trademark owners who are unaware that their
marks are being purchased by other advertisers.
While the sound recording
copyright owner was not directly losing money by his work being publicly performed,
the trademark owner may be losing traffic to his website or sales of his goods, and
may be experiencing a loss of reputation or dilution of his mark. 343
332 See JOY R. BUTLER, THE PERMISSION SEEKER'S GUIDE THROUGH THE LEGAL JUNGLE 10708 (Sashay Communications 2007) (explaining fair use within trademark law).
333See id.
334See, e.g., Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 329-30

(D.N.J.2006) (discussing comparative advertising as a form of fair use of trademarks).
335See generally Irene Calboli, The Sunset of "Quality Control" in Modern

Trademark
Licensing,57 AM. U. L. REV. 341 (2007) (describing the current trends in trademark licensing).
336

See CHRIS ANDERSON,

THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF

MORE (Hyperion 2008) (discussing how technology allows businesses to provide their goods and
services to niche markets).
337See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C062454-MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (showing an example of an advertiser with a narrow online marketing
focus within paid search).
338 See id. at *4.
339See STEPHEN ELIAS & RICHARD STIM, TRADEMARK LEGAL CARE FOR YOUR BUSINESS &
PRODUCT NAME 256-57 (NOLO, 8th ed. 2007) (describing the cost of trademark infringement
litigation).
340 See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Old Songs Generate New Cash For Artists, N.Y. TIMES, at E1 (Dec.
28, 2004) (explaining how many sound recording copyright owners did not know about the sound
recording copyright and therefore did not collect).
341 See id.
342 See id.
343 See, e.g., Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C062454-MMC, 2008 WL 449835, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (looking at impressions and clicks as indicators of the infringing impact);

[9:553 2009]

Trademark Use as Keywords

This proposal tends to go against the responsibility that a trademark owner has
in policing his mark. 3 44 However, trademark owners do not have control of the use of
their marks in paid search programs currently. 345 While the limited litigation on this
issue has shown that the use of a trademark in keywords within paid search does
constitute a use in commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act, no case has
determined whether this use has created a likelihood of confusion.346 Therefore, the
347
current paid search system can legally continue to sell trademarks as keywords.
This proposal seeks to extend the control that a trademark owner has over his
mark and take it out of a virtual purgatory regarding how he may police use of his
marks in paid search programs. 348 This proposal will statutorily retain the strength
of the mark as it relates to its use as a keyword in paid search without the owner
having to employ extensive policing tactics. 349 In the new system, rather than third
parties having a right to use another's mark in paid search without the mark owner's
permission and without compensating the mark owner, the mark owner would retain
control of whether his mark was licensed by third parties. 35 0
Part of the
responsibility of the firm that administers the royalties would be to ensure
compliance from mark owners. 35 1 If a mark is licensed, it would be because the
352
owner has given strict permission as to that particular licensee.
Another issue is the potential for trademark abandonment if a mark owner
allows for another advertiser to license his mark but does not participate in paid
search himself.35 3 Not outbidding a competitor for one's own mark or disallowing a
competitor to use one's own mark does not constitute abandonment of the mark
today. 354 Mark owners may have this concern today, but under this proposal, they
355
would no longer have this issue.
This proposal would allow advertisers to ban the use of their marks if they
choose. 356 It also creates a revenue stream for mark owners for an activity that
357
currently takes place.
Complaint at 58, Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google, Inc., No. 1:09cv736 (E.D. Va. July 10, 2009)
("Google intentionally traffics in the infringement and dilution of the Rosetta Stone Marks .. ").
344 See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
17:17 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining how failure to police one's mark may cause the mark to lose
significance in the marketplace, but that litigating "every possible infringing use to avoid a holding
of abandonment" is not required).
345 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
346 See id. at 131 (remanding to the district court to determine if a likelihood of confusion exists
when using a trademarked term as a keyword in paid search).
347 See Google AdWords Trademark Policy, supra note 35.
348 See Dogan, supra note 217, at 1347 (discussing the need for more clear guidance in
trademark law on use of a trademarked keyword within paid search).
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CONCLUSION

The magnitude of the impact of search engine marketing on trademark law has
only recently started to come into focus. 358 As technology evolves and creates new
streams of commerce, the laws to protect advertisers' and consumers' intellectual
property rights rarely keep pace. 359 We witnessed this in the copyright arena with
digital public performance rights for sound recording owners, 36 0 and we are
witnessing it again in the trademark arena with the increased use of trademarks
36 1
within paid search programs.
Congress needs to decide whether advertisers who use competitor's trademarks
in their own keywords for paid search are brilliant marketing strategists or are
infringing the trademark owner's rights.

358 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding Google's
use of Rescuecom's trademark as a keyword in its AdWords program was a use in commerce).
359 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(showing copyright holders' fight for stricter enforcement of their rights due to peer-to-peer filesharing technology); Rescuecom, 562 F.3d 123 (showing trademark owners' asserting their rights in
the paid search environment).
360 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006)).
361 See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d 123.

